Sunnis and Shi'a and Kurds, O My!

There has been a lot of talk lately about Iraq splitting into three states, so, just for the record, I'd like to remind everyone that this has been my prediction for a nearly inevitable outcome from the beginning.

Iraq is not, and has never been, a cohesive nation-state. It was created arbitrarily at the end of WWI by the European colonial powers, and lumped together three ethnic/religious groups with thousands of years of bloody conflict and mutual antagonism behind them. Saddam "kept the peace" by enforcing a Tito-style totalitarian, secular "national unity" government.

But we have seen what happens when such a ridgid totalitarian structure is abruptly removed. Peaceful self-government is a tricky business - it requires a set of strong social institutions that various interest groups can and do trust to produce fair and reasonable compromises. But there are no viable social or governmental institutions in Iraq, and there has been no form of real civic involvement for over a generation. The Iraqi people simply have no means to peacefully interact and govern themselves, and the only social structures that exist are the aforementioned, mutually antagonistic religious/ethnic/clan structures. Those who were not fools (Thomas Friedman), knaves (Dick Cheney), or the ideologically blinded (Paul Wolfowitz) could (and did) predict that, in such an environment, sectarian and ethnic violence was inevitable.

The second stage - civil war - is certainly less inevitable than the first. If the initial throes of violence were well managed, so that organic civic structures could emerge in a context free of violence and antagonism, it could be possible for a unified federal government to emerge. This always was a difficult proposition, however, as the natural tendency of such interest groups is toward mutual distrust and violence. Only careful and competent management of the situation could yield any different result. My own prediction that civil war would, in the end, occur was based on my understanding that those managing the reconstruction effort were not competent - indeed that they were (and are) incompetent, corrupt ideologues, more concerned with imposing a flat tax than maintaining social order. The flow of reports from Iraq regarding the tenure of Paul Bremer, the lack of effective management plans and troops on the ground, and the widespread scamming of billions of dollars by reconstruction contractors has more than borne out this understanding. [There is certainly much more to say about the difficulties such a group was bound to have in successfully managing such a project - which inherently involves a belief in and understanding of government (i.e. what it can do and why it is so vital that it does that) - but I will leave that for another post]

So here we are, on the cusp of civil war. There is still some chance this can be avoided, but this chance is small, and would take extraordinarily effective management of the diplomatic situation - something of which the present administration is simply incapable.

The real questions at this point are whether this situation can be managed so as to avoid a longer, drawn out period of sectarian violence in Iraq, and, more importantly, whether we can avoid a larger, regional conflagration involving Iran and Turkey.

My prediction regarding the first question is that a long period of violent civil war is the most likely outcome, for the same reason as the breakup of Iraq was likely: the Bush Administration is simply incompetent to deal with the matter properly. Beyond this, the necessary enforcement of civil order by foreign troops (as was required in Yugoslavia) is not practicable at this point. There is tremendous war fatigue in the US, and nobody else trusts the US enough to pledge the necessary amount of troops. Throw in the fact that control of tremendous oil wealth is part of the game, and it's clear that nobody will give up easily.

The possibility of a larger regional conflagration presents a different question. Clearly the Kurds are doing what they can to prepare for managing their own independent state, which they want to include the oil-rich region around Kirkuk. The Turks, however, loathe the notion of an independent Kurdistan, especially one empowered by oil money. Nor does Iran have any desire to allow Iraq's oil to be controlled by any group other than its Shi'ite puppets in Iraq. The Saudis are too weak to get actively involved in any regional military action, but would certainly support and fund guerrilla actions by the Sunni/Baathist minority against both of the other groups. This does not necessarily pit Iran against Turkey, by any means - they would both be allied, in a sense, against an empowered Kurdish state. It does raise two possibilities for more widespread regional conflict, however. The first is that a potential Sunni/Kurd guerrilla alliance might engage in guerrilla activities in Iran and Turkey, sparking increased militarism in those countries. The second is that an extended period of civil war would create tremendous opportunities for "failed state" terrorist groups to take hold and export violence.

So remember, you read it here first.

And, heckuva job, Georgie!